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I. Introduction
The literature on labor market transitions is extensive.' However, there
are very few studies that have looked at the relationship between asset
holdings and labor market transitions. Within the standard search frame-
work, the objective function is specified in terms of income maximization
rather than utility maximization. This rules out any impact of wealth on
job-search outcomes and impHcitly assumes individual risk neutrality and
no borrowing constraints.
Danforth (1979) shows that financial asset holdings and acceptance
wages are positively correlated, under the assumptions of consumption
maximization and decreasing absolute risk aversion. Blundell, Magnac,
and Meghir (1997) investigate the relationship between savings and labor
market transitions, deriving a negative relationship between initial wealth
and the probability of staying or becoming employed, under the as-
sumption that leisure is a normal good.
Financial assets are absent from most empirical models of labor market
transitions. Bloemen (1995) estimates the impact of assets on labor market
transitions, using a Dutch data set. He finds evidence of a negative re-
lationship between savings and the probability of becoming employed.
The significance of this negative relationship, however, depends on the
specification chosen. He concludes that measuring the relation between
the job-acceptance decision and wealth by means of measuring the relation
between labor market transitions and wealth may be subject to measure-
ment problems, as the probabihty of a transition comprises both indi-
vidual preferences and demand-side factors. If, for example, wealth is
correlated with unobserved individual specific characteristics that also
affect the job-offer probability, the estimated effect of wealth on the tran-
sition probability may not represent solely the effect of wealth on indi-
vidual preferences. This issue escaped the theoretical models put forward
by Danforth (1979) and Blundell et al. (1997). Rendon (1997) models the
interaction of borrowing constraints and job search, showing that initial
wealth positively affects success in the labor market: wealthier people are
more selective and obtain higher wages. The implications of the model
are tested with data for the United States drawn from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey.
Stancanelh (1999) estimates the impact of financial resources on the
duration of the unemployment spell, using a survey of the inflow into
unemployment for the United Kingdom, the Survey of Living Standards
of the Unemployed. She estimates a reduced-form specification that as-
sumes exogeneity of beginning-of-the-period individual assets and finds
' See, e.g., Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) or Devine and Kiefer (1991) for
an account.
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a small but significantly negative impact of financial assets on the prob-
ability of leaving unemployment.
In this article, we use subjective information on the reservation wage
to investigate the impact of the job seeker's asset holdings on the reser-
vation wage and the employment probability.
Subjective data on reservation wages have been used several times in
the literature. Lancaster and Chesher (1983) use both information on
subjective reservation wages and data on expected wages to test the pre-
dictions of the job-search model, bypassing the estimation of the model
with transition data and data on accepted wages.^ Van den Berg and Gorter
(1997) use information on self-reported reservation wages as a dependent
variable in a regression framework. Van den Berg (1990) uses data on
subjective reservation wages to identify a structural nonstationary job-
search model. The present study is, to our knowledge, the first that models
and estimates the impact of wealth on self-reported reservation wages.
The data set we use contains information on individual asset holdings
and labor market transitions. This allows us to test whether wealth affects
the probability of a transition into employment via the reservation wage.
This is an advantage as compared to previous empirical studies that mea-
sured the effect of wealth on job searchers' acceptance strategies only via
labor market transitions.
The article is structured as follows: In the next section, the theoretical
model is spelled out. The empirical model is specified in Section III. The
data are described in Section IV. Results of estimation are discussed in
Section V. In Section VI, conclusions are drawn.
II. The Theoretical Framework
Typically, job-search models have assumed that individuals are income
maximizers. This implies that individuals are risk neutral. If this assump-
tion is relaxed, individuals can be described as utility maximizers. In this
case, financial assets must be taken into account. Here we show how
financial wealth may enter a job-search model along the lines of the struc-
tural model put forward by Danforth (1979). The reader is referred to
Danforth (1979) for a formal derivation.
We set up a model of unemployed job search. Individuals are assumed
to maximize the utility they derive from consumption. They are faced by
an intertemporal budget constraint defining the relations among con-
sumption, income, and wealth accumulation. Utihty is assumed to be
intertemporally separable, and the utility functions are of the Von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern type. Individuals' utility can be written as in Danforth
(1979, p. 112):
^ The reservation wages in their data are classified in 12 wage categories.
Transitions into Employment 403
f/(c,,c2,-) = 2r«(c,), (1)
1 = 1
where ^' is the discount factor. Utility is assumed to be twice differentiable
and strictly concave. The assumption of strict concavity implies that in-
dividuals are risk averse.
Jobs are characterized in terms of the wage they offer. The probability
of receiving a job offer is X,.' Job offers are characterized in terms of a
stochastic wage-offer distribution F(w) with density function f{w). Jobs
last forever, and no recall of job offers is allowed.
The budget constraint restricts individual assets at time t to be equal
to assets the previous period plus income minus consumption goods pur-
chased the previous period.'' Defining A, as wealth at the beginning of
period t, b as unemployment income, w as the individual wage, c as
consumption, and r as the constant interest rate, the budget constraint
reads as
A, = {A,., - c,_, + b){l + r), (2)
for the unemployed and as
A, = {A,_, - c,_, + w){l + r), (3)
for employed persons.
The employed person's maximum utility is given by
JiA, w) = max [u{c) + ^/[(^ - c + w){\ + r), w]}, (4)
and the unemployed person's maximum utility is
S(A) = max «|(c) + ^(1 - \]S\{A - c + b){l + r)] +
- c + b){l + r),w]}dEiw)}.
(5)
It follows that a job offer is accepted iiJ{A, w) > S{A) and rejected oth-
erwise. The reservation wage, w'"', can be defined as that wage offer at
which individuals are indifferent about continuing to search or accepting
the job offer, that is, as that wage at which J{A, w) = 5(^ 4). As a result,
the reservation wage will also be a function of individual asset holdings:
' Danforth assumes that the offer probability is constant in each time period
and equal to one offer per period.
^ Danforth sets a limit to the end of period borrowing capacity.
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w''' = w"'{A). In particular, reservation wages are increasing in financial
assets under given conditions that rule out risk neutrality. For example,
Danforth (1979) shows that this is true under the assumption of absolute
decreasing risk aversion, requiring ~u"/u' to be a decreasing function of
The employment probability, 6, can be written as the product of the
probabilities of receiving a given job offer and accepting it:
(6)
III. The Empirical Model
The complexity of the dynamic programming problem (5) prevents us
from finding an analytic solution for the reservation wage w''''{A), which
characterizes the individual's optimal search strategy. For this reason,
applied work so far has concentrated on specifying the transition prob-
ability with wealth as a regressor. In doing so, much of the original model
structure of (6) is lost. In particular, past work has ignored that wealth
enters the structural probability (6), because of its effect on the reservation
wage, which, in turn, affects the acceptance probability.'
In this article, we use data on reservation wages to exhibit the relations
among wealth, reservation wages, and transitions. In order to do so, we
estimate jointly the acceptance probability and the job-offer probability.
We specify our empirical model as a simultaneous-equation system. Job
offers are characterized in terms of the attached wage. The wage-offer
distribution is assumed to be lognormal and specified as follows:
lnze;,, = m% + e,,e,, ~ N(0, T'), (7)
where i relates to individual i in the population of unemployed job search-
ers and k are individual characteristics. The parameters of the wage-offer
distribution, m, are estimated from lognormal wage regressions for the
population of the employed, corrected for selection into employment of
labor force participants (see tables Al and A2 in app. A).
Reservation wages are specified lognormally as a function of individual
characteristics, R, indicating the logarithm of the observed reservation
wage:
+ 0'X, + £,,, £., ~ NiO, a/), (8)
' If reservation wages are in the lower tail of the wage distribution the effect
of wealth on the transition probability may be hard to measure.
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where X,, is a vector containing individual characteristics.' The functional
form g is specified as a quadratic to allow for nonlinearities. The right-
hand side of (8) can be interpreted as an approximation to the solution
of a structural search model. The error term £,, may represent approxi-
mation error, measurement error, and randomness in preferences.
To allow for possible correlation of wealth with the error of the res-
ervation-wage equation, an equation for wealth is specified:''
Ai, = M'^,,-, + t',-,,-,, v,,^, ~ N{0, ai), (9)
where q includes individual characteristics.* Period t - 1 values of char-
acteristics are used, as >1,, is decided upon in that period.
The probability of receiving any job offer is parameterized as
/'(joboffer) = X,, = l - e x p (-,,,), (10)
where rj,-, is a positive parameter. The larger its value, the higher will be
the job-offer probability. The parameter depends on individual charac-
teristics, z,,:
r;,, = exp (T'ZJ, (11)
where 7 is a parameter and z,, includes individual characteristics, among
which may be elapsed unemployment duration at the time.
We assume joint normality of the error terms of the wage equation,
the reservation-wage equation, and the equation for wealth. We define p,
as the correlation coefficient between the wage errors e,, from (7) and the
errors £,, of the reservation-wage equation (8), Pj as the correlation co-
efficient between wage errors and the wealth errors t^ , ,_i from (9), and p,
as the correlation between wealth and reservation wages.
A job offer is accepted if the attached wage exceeds the reservation
wage. Under the assumption of joint normahty, the acceptance probability,
conditional on wealth and the observed reservation wage, can be written
as:
' We experiment with the inclusion and exclusion among the regressors of a
measure of elapsed unemployment duration, as discussed below. The data available
allow one to construct some broadly approximate measure of elapsed unem-
ployment duration.
' Note that it follows from the theoretical model specified by Danforth (1979)
that the value of wealth (in its role as state variable), prior to the period in which
the transition may be observed, is used. So for the transition, wealth acts as a
lagged endogenous variable. Correlations in errors may, however, occur due to
random preferences, other types of unobserved heterogeneity, selectivity bias, or
measurement error.
' An extension of the model includes elapsed unemployment duration, as dis-
cussed in the section on the results of estimation.
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(12)
where #(.) is the standard normal distribution function and use has been
made of the normality of the distribution of wages, conditional on wealth
and reservation wages. The expression iA(e,,|e,,,'y,,_]) refers to the part of
the conditional mean that arises due to possible nonzero correlation be-
tween the errors of the equations, and ff^i.^ is the conditional variance of
the wage error term.
The probability of observing a transition during period t can then be
written as the product of the job-offer probability (10) and the acceptance
probabihty (12):
[1-exp(-77,,)] 1 - (13)
For each individual, the likelihood contribution is obtained by multiplying
the transition probability (or one minus the transition probability if no
transition occurs) by the joint density of wealth and reservation wages.
For individuals whose reservation wage is not observed, we integrate over
reservation wages.'
Wealth enters the model as one of the simultaneous equations and as
a regressor (in quadratic form) in the reservation-wage equation. There-
fore, wealth is allowed to affect the job-finding probability indirectly via
the reservation-wage equation and via possible error autocorrelations.
The model so far has not accounted for possible effects of wealth on
the offer probability, as these were ignored in the theoretical literature
that forms the basis for our model. Wealth and the arrival rate may be
correlated due to unobserved heterogeneity (the individuals with the
higher levels of wealth may have the higher arrival rates). Moreover, ec-
onomic models with endogenous search intensity predict a relationship
between wealth and the arrival rate. Danforth (1979) and Blundell et al.
(1997) assume that the arrival rate is given (exogenous) to the searcher.
In models of job search with an endogenously determined search intensity
(see Burdett and Mortensen 1978; Mortensen 1986), the arrival rate de-
pends on "search effort," the optimal level of which is determined by the
model, and therefore will depend on the state variables in this model.'°
Although the theoretical models by Mortensen (1986) and Burdett and
Mortensen (1978) do not contain wealth, on the basis of these models it
' For a few observations, we do observe the reservation wage, but not whether
or not a transition occurred. For those observations the likelihood contribution
is given by the joint density of reservation wages and wealth.
'°Fougere, Pradel, and Roger (1997) and Bloemen (1999) estimate structural
models of job search with endogenous search intensity. Their models, though, do
not contain wealth.
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seems reasonable to expect that a higher level of wealth would lead to a
lower intensity of search and, consequently, to a lower arrival rate. Our
empirical framework is suitable for testing for the presence of wealth in
the arrival rate. The models of search intensity, however, imply that, not
only wealth but also income variables should be included in the arrival
rate. Therefore, in the empirical implementation, we will, by means of
sensitivity analysis, also estimate a model variant in which we include
wealth, income, other income, and a dummy indicating the possession of
a house with a mortgage in the job-offer arrival rate.
IV. The Data
We use for the analysis a panel data set of the Dutch population, the
Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) collected by Statistics Netherlands (Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek). The SEP sample is drawn from the population
of Dutch households and includes all household members aged 16 or over.
The advantage of the SEP over alternative data sources is that the ques-
tionnaire covers a broad range of asset types. Furthermore, information
on reservation wages was collected, though only in a few waves.
This survey was started in 1984. It was run two times per year, in April
and October. Information on income was collected in October only. In
1987, Statistics Netherlands started collecting detailed information on as-
set and debt components once a year in the April survey. Beginning in
1990, there was a change in the setup of the SEP questionnaire and from
then onward all information was collected once a year in May.
Data on (self-reported) reservation wages were collected only in a lim-
ited number of waves in 1988 and 1989." Information on reservation
wages was collected only for individuals who report to be searching for
a job.
The Selection of the Sample for the Analysis
We make use of the SEP waves from 1987 to 1990. We select in each
year the sample of the unemployed that reported to be searching actively
for a job and for whom we observe wealth and other relevant informa-
tion.'^ We use information on the labor market state in the subsequent
waves to determine whether someone made a transition into employ-
" Information on reservation wages was collected in the surveys of October
1988, April 1989, and October 1989. The consequences for the estimation of the
model have been mentioned already in the previous section: we integrate over
reservation wages for those observations for which they are not available.
'^  Note, therefore, that in each year we select a random sample out of the
population of unemployed searchers. We have selected searchers as data on res-
ervation wages are collected only for survey respondents that report to be search-
ing for a job.
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ment." All the observations thus obtained are pooled together for the
analysis. By construction, we have a sample with multiple observations
on some of the unemployed, as illustrated in table Bl in appendix B. We
have included wave dummies in the model. One reason for this is to pick
up changes in macroeconomic conditions. Wave dummies may also proxy
differences in questionnaire design across waves.
We estimate the model separately for household heads and spouses."
Some of the household heads (36%) are women, but none of these women
have children. Therefore, we assume that their behavior is comparable to
that of male household heads.
The resulting sample consists of 552 observations on household heads
and 474 observations on spouses. The number of transitions into em-
ployment observed for heads is 167. For spouses, we observe 129 tran-
sitions into employment. We observe reservation wages and expected
hours for 284 of the household heads (which is about 50% of the heads)
and for 230 of the spouses. As already mentioned, when estimating the
model, we integrate over reservation wages for those observations for
which reservation wages were not available.
Descriptive Statistics and the Quality of Wealth Data
Sample means and standard deviations for income and wealth variables
are provided in table 1. These variables are measured in real terms in 1987
prices. We use monthly price indices to deflate the variables.'* The unit
of measurement is guilders. Wealth is defined as net financial assets. The
following asset components are included: the balance on current accounts;
the balance on savings and deposit accounts; the value of savings certif-
icates; the values of stocks, bonds, and options; and the amount of money
lent. The debt components included are any debt or loan, the value of
hire purchase, and the value of other loans and debt. The SEP also contains
information on the value of the house and the value of the mortgage. We
did not include them in the calculation of net wealth. Due to the large
number of missing observations on the value of the house, including them
would lead to a further reduction of the sample size. Information on
ownership of a house and a mortgage is, however, available for the sample.
' ' Observations on the same individual from the years 1988-91 are linked year
by year to allow us to observe a change in the labor market state in a year.
'•* The selection on the basis of heads and spouses implies that we do not perform
the analysis for other household members, like children living in the household.
'* The source is Statistics Netherlands social economic monthly statistics.
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Table 1
Asset Holdings, Unemployment Income, and Reservation Wages
Variable
Household
wealth
Reservation
wage,
monthlyUnemployment
income,
monthly
Unemployment
income*
Other personal
income
Other personal
income*
Spouse's
income
Spouse's
income*
Expected hours
Age
Household
Mean
4,228.15
1,521.6
1,163.1
1,281.5
249.2
366.0
203.6
1,158.7
32.8
35.9
Heads
SD
21,818.7
603.1
653.9
564.9
520.0
500.1
547.0
771.(>
9.8
10.3
Spouses
Mean
17,143.84
827.90 •
216.05
825.86
9.77
87.38
3,146.19
3,179.73
20.03
35.24
SD
36,862.47
542.70
477.27
606.84
59.80
160.04
1,459.42
1,430.31
8.81
7.4
NOTE.—The unit of measurement of the income variables is guilders per month in real terms at 1987
prices. The total number of observations for household heads is 552; for spouses, 474. The number of
riousehold heads (spouses) that report nonzero amounts is 97 (469) for spouse's income, 501 (124) for
unemployment income, and 403 (53) for other personal income. The reservation wage is available for
287 ol)servations on household heads and 231 on spouses. Expected hours are available for 290 obser-
vations on household heads and 250 on spouses. There are 284 observations on household heads and
230 on spouses for which both hours and reservation wages are observed.
* Indicates the distribution recomputed excluding the zeros.
SO we can include a dummy variable for ownership, to check whether
this affects the results."
From table 1, it emerges that the mean value of household wealth for
the sample of unemployed household heads is much lower than the mean
value for the sample of unemployed spouses. This signals that at least in
this respect the two samples are not homogenous. To gain more insights
into the distribution of wealth for the two samples, we report in table 2
the quantiles of the two distributions. From inspection of this table, it
can be concluded again that households where the head is unemployed
appear to have lower wealth than households where the spouse is un-
employed. In table 1, we also show the distribution of wealth for all
households in the SEP, pooled over the periods selected for our analysis.
'^  The phrasing of the SEP questionnaire is such that first the respondent is
asked whether he or she owns a certain asset or debt category. If ownership
applies, then the respondent is asked to report the corresponding value. Thus,
information on ownership may be available while information on the value is
not.
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Table 2
Distribution of Wealth
10%
25%
50% (median)
75%
90%
Number of observations
(in Dutch guilders)
Household Heads
-4,679
-793
998
6,409
17,871
552
Spouses
-3,132
1,069
8,411
20,669
43,442
474
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Socio-Economic Panel
-1,033
2,305
1,144
28,916
69,076
18,049
This shows that while households in which the spouse is unemployed
have slightly lower wealth quantiles than all households in the SEP, house-
holds in which the head is unemployed have much lower wealth quantiles
than all households in the SEP.
The quality of the wealth data in the SEP has been the subject of several
studies. Alessie, Pradhan, and Zandvliet (1993) compared the distribution
of wealth in the SEP with information on wealth from a survey run by
some Dutch banks (Collectieve Banken Onderzoek). They also con-
structed an aggregate measure of savings based on the wealth data in the
SEP and compared it with aggregate (macro) information on household
savings at the national level. Their overall conclusion is that the wealth
data in the SEP are of reasonable quahty (see also Alessie and Zandvliet
1993). However, they also concluded that the value of savings and deposits
may be underreported. A study by Statistics Netherlands (see Meuwissen
1994) concludes also that savings, and especially deposits, are underes-
timated. To correct for underreporting of savings, Meuwissen combines
information from the SEP with administrative income and tax data from
another survey (Inkomens Panel Onderzoek). The resulting corrected
distribution still shows that for households of various composition the
10% quantile is negative. Only households in the highest income group
and the retired have a positive 10% quantile. The 25% quantile is found
to be positive for most categories of households, except for the group of
those who are inactive in the labor market. On the basis of this evidence,
we can reasonably assume that the negative 10% quantile found in table
2 is not the result of underreporting. Moreover, the negative 25% quantile
for household heads in our sample is not at variance with the findings of
Meuwissen (1994).
We define unemployment income as including all unemployment ben-
efits, either unemployment insurance or social assistance. Other income
includes any other social security benefits—such as, for instance, child
benefit—the income of the partner (when not given separately), and any
other income. All income variables are defined in guilders per month.
We show frequencies of the discrete variables in table 3. The educational
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Table 3
Discrete Background Variables
Variable
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Education sector 2
Education sector 3
Education sector 4
Any children
Woman
Single
Unemployment duration,
0-6 months
Employment duration,
7-16 months
Employment duration,
> 16 months
House owner
With mortgage
Inheritance
Household Heads,
Sample %
27.4
31.1
19.1
23.4
18.1
15.7
42.8
35.8
40.0
22.8
13.9
58.5
17.4
15.0
1.6
Spouses,
Sample %
32.9
33.5
20.0
2.7
28.7
31.6
78.7
100.0
8.0
14.3
12.0
70.3
62.4
61.7
2.5
NOTE.—Education level and sector dummies arc defined in the text. The number of
observations is 552 for housebold heads and 474 for spouses.
level dummies are defined in increasing order from the lowest, primary
school level (level 1), to the highest, university and vocational colleges
training (level 4). The education-sector dummies in table 3 are defined as
follows: Sector 1, the reference sector, relates to individuals without skill-
specific education. Sector 2 includes mathematics, chemistry, biology, and
other technical skills. Sector 3 refers to medical and economic or admin-
istrative skills. Sector 4 includes agriculture, transportation, and social
skills.
Unemployment duration can only be measured in broad intervals given
the available information. A striking feature of the data is the large per-
centage of the unemployed in the sample that experience long-term un-
employment. In the period of time considered, the level of unemployment
in the Netherlands was very high, and the long-term unemployed were
over 50% of the unemployed pool, as shown in table B2, in appendix B,
which compares information on this statistic from different sources. The
observation that the percentages of long-term unemployed women in this
table are lower than in our sample of spouses (table 3) stems from the
fact that the figures in table B2 refer to both single and married women.
Subjective Reservation Wages and Consistency Checks
Reservation wages and hours constitute "subjective information" in the
sense that they are self-reported by the survey participants—like any other
information in the survey. First, the respondents were asked how many
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hours they expected to work each week in a new job. Then, they were
asked to report the level of the minimum acceptable net monthly income
for a job with a number of working hours equal to their expected hours
of work. In the estimation of the model, we have to take into account
that the reported reservation wage is conditioned on the reported number
of expected working hours. Therefore, to estimate the reservation wage
(eq. [8]), we must either transform the reservation wage to an hourly
reservation wage or include the number of expected hours of work among
the regressors or possibly both. We come back to this issue in the next
section.
To check whether the values of the reported reservation wages are
reasonable, we have proceeded as follows: First, we have compared the
mean value of the reservation wage in table 1 with the mean value of the
benefit income from the same table. For household heads, the mean un-
employment income is 1,163 guilders per month, and the mean reservation
wage is 1,522 guilders per month. The standard deviations of the two are
of comparable size. For spouses the mean unemployment income is 216
if we incorporate observations with a zero unemployment income, and
826 if observations with a zero unemployment income are excluded. The
mean reservation wage for spouses is 828. Since one may expect that
individuals wish to have a higher income when they work than when
they do not,' ' these findings suggest that reservation wages are reasonable.
Next, we have compared the distribution of reservation wages to the
distribution of wages at the same point in time. The unemployed are
bound to have a reservation wage that is comparable to the wages of
employed individuals with similar characteristics at the same point in time.
Therefore, we have compared the quartiles of the distribution of reser-
vation wages with those from the distribution of wages, disaggregated by
age groups and education levels. This comparison was performed sepa-
rately for household heads and spouses, and for two different years, 1988
and 1989 (more details can be found in app. C). We found that the quartiles
of the distribution of reservation wages were always lower than the cor-
responding quartiles of the wage distribution. Therefore, we concluded
again that the reported reservation wages seem to be reasonable.
Finally, we have compared the reservation wage with the wage observed
after acceptance of a job and the wage observed before the reported res-
ervation wage (the wage of the previous job). If an individual accepts a
job, the attached wage is bound to be higher than his or her reservation
wage. For individuals who reported their reservation wage in October
1988 or October 1989 and who accepted a job within a year after this
date, the value of the accepted wage can at earliest be observed 1 year
" Unless there are considerable nonfinancial benefits to working or working
serves as an investment.
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after the reporting of the reservation wage, due to the construction of the
questionnaire. Similarly, for individuals who reported their reservation
wage in April 1989 and who accepted a job within 6 months, the value
of the accepted wage can at earliest be observed 6 months after the re-
porting of the reservation wage. Therefore, we do not observe both the
reservation wage and the wage at the time of job acceptance. This is
important since reservation wages may fall over time. Another drawback
of this comparison for our sample is that the number of observations for
which we observe both a reservation wage in one wave and an accepted
wage in the nearest wave thereafter is not too large. In appendix C, we
show that the median difference between the accepted wage and the res-
ervation wage is positive for household heads in the 2 periods for which
the comparison is performed. For spouses, the median difference is pos-
itive in 1 period of comparison, but equal to —0.36 in the second.'* The
comparison with the wage before unemployment shows a positive median
for the difference between the previous wage and the reservation wage.
Although there is no theoretical argument for this difference to be positive,
it feels intuitively comfortable if it is.
On the basis of this analysis (comparison with the benefit level, with
the distributions of wages of similar individuals and with the wage before
and after unemployment), we conclude that the reservation-wage data are
of reasonable quality.
The reported values of expected hours seem to take plausible values.
The mean of the distribution is about 33 hours for household heads and
20 hours for spouses.
V. Results of Estimation
In this section, we discuss the results of estimation of the model. First,
we present single equation estimates of the reservation-wage equation.
Next, maximum likelihood estimates of the joint model of reservation
wages, wealth and transitions are discussed. Finally, wealth elasticities are
calculated for different groups of the unemployed.
The Reservation-Wage Equation
In this section, we discuss the results of estimation of the reservation-
wage equation (8). First of all, attention should be paid to the definition
of an hourly reservation wage. We have described in the previous section
information on expected hours of work and reservation wages that is
available in the SEP. The survey respondents are first requested to report
their expected number of hours of work. Next, they are asked to report
their minimum acceptable monthly net wage income for those hours of
" In an earlier version of the article, this finding motivated us not to perform
the analysis for spouses.
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work. On the basis of this construction, it seems reasonable to assume
that the expectation of the error of the reservation-wage equation, con-
ditional on the expected number of hours, is zero.
However, since expected hours may also proxy individual's preferences,
unobserved individual specific preferences may cause hours to be cor-
related with the error term (see discussion in app. D). To correct for this
one should specify an hours equation." In particular, instrumental vari-
ables estimation or a joint estimation procedure could be used to test and
correct for the possible endogeneity of hours in the reservation-wage
equation. There are no theoretical insights on the identifying variables
for this relationship, as reservation wages and hours appear to be deter-
mined by the same variables. One possibility would be to use observed
working hours in the previous jobs as an instrument (for those obser-
vations for which this variable is available). However, by the same kind
of reasoning, this variable is also likely to be correlated with unobserved
random preferences. Therefore, we confine ourselves to present results of
estimation of the reservation-wage equation with and without expected
hours on the right-hand side of the equation. The first model is based on
the assumption of no correlation of expected hours with the disturbance
term. The second one can be interpreted as a reduced-form reservation-
wage equation.^" This allows us to infer tbe sensitivity of the impact of
wealth on the reservation wage, with respect to the inclusion of working
hours.
We are faced with similar considerations concerning the possible cor-
relation of wealth and the disturbance term, because of individual specific
unobserved heterogeneity that may determine both the level of wealth
and the reservation wage. However, finding appropriate instruments is
less problematic here. Since wealth enters the reservation-wage equation
as a predetermined variable, we can use lagged values of the right-hand-
side variables as instruments for wealth. The strongest source of identi-
fying information is lagged income. We test whether the correlation be-
tween wealth and the disturbance term is zero by means of a Hausman
test.^'
Results of the estimation are presented in table 4, for the specification
that includes hours among the regressors. We present separate estimates
for household heads and spouses. The function g{A^) has been specified
as a quadratic form. Our findings indicate that individual wealth has a
" In this case we could think of a semistnictural hours equation that would be
a function of the (expected) wage, other income, and the level of wealth.
°^ "Reduced form" with respect to expected working hours.
" In the next subsection, a separate wealth equation is included and jointly
estimated in the simultaneous-equations model. We carry out a likelihood ratio
test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient of the disturbances from
the reservation-wage equation and the wealth equation is zero.
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Table 4
Reservation-Wage Equation: Estimation by OLS of the Specification with
Hours
Variable
Constant
Any child
Woman
Log (age)
[Log (aee)]^
Unemployment
income.
1,000 fl
Other house-
hold income
Log (hours)
Education
level 2
Education
level 3
Education
level 4
Woman by log
(hours)
Wealth,
10,000 fl
Wealth'
House with
mortgage
Wave 2
a.
Adjusted R'
Household
Coefficient
-4 .91*
.084**
-1.14**
4.95**
-.67**
.044*
-.0000027
-.15**
.018
.14**
.20**
.31**
.029**
-.0012**
.010
-.0011
.26
.27
Heads
SE
2.52
.036
.27
1.45
.20
.025
.000026
.06
.044
.04
.06
.08
.01
.0004
.047
.032
Spouses
Coefficient
-10.30
-.10
7.75*
-1.09*
.090
-.000025
.094
.093
.12
.36**
.052**
-.0019**
-.060
-.12**
.43
.13
SE
7.43
.10
4.22
.60
.070
.000031
.070
.094
.10
.11
.019
.0010
.069
.06
NOTE.—The dependent variable is log (reservation wage per hour). OLS = ordinary least squares.
Household heads include single women (lone mothers are not included). Spouses include only women.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the (net) hourly reservation wage per month, in Dutch guilders
(fl). The number of observations for which both the reservation wage and the expected hours were
available is 284. All the financial variables (income, wealth, unemployment income) are measured in real
terms in 1987 prices for all years. One wave dummy appears (wave 2, 1988) since reservation wages are
observed in 1988 and 1989. Education levels are the individual education levels measured from the lower
level up. The base for the dummy is education level 1. Education level 4 corresponds to higher education.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
*• Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
significant positive impact on the reservation wage for both household
heads and spouses. This is in line with the predictions of the theory. The
estimated effect of wealth on the reservation wage is larger for spouses.
For household heads, a 100% increase in the level of financial assets, at
the mean level of assets (see table 1), is found to increase the reservation
wage by 1.2%. For spouses, a 100% increase in the level of financial
assets, at the mean level of assets (see table 1), raises the reservation wage
by 7.7%.
Overall, our results are very plausible. For male household heads, we
find that the reservation-wage rate decreases with expected hours, whereas
416 Bloemen/Stancanelli
for women it increases. This may reflect male preferences for full-time
work and female preferences for part-time work—that is, women must
be compensated more for working longer hours. For spouses, we find
that the effect of hours on the reservation-wage rate is not significant.
For them, the adjustment of the reservation wage for hours by taking the
(log) reservation wage per hour as a left-hand-side variable is sufficient.
Women who are household heads have significantly lower reservation
wages than men. The impact of gender on reservation wages is modeled
in the equation for household heads with the gender dummy and the
interaction variable of hours and gender. We ran an i^-test for the null
hypothesis that pooHng of observations on household heads of different
genders is to be preferred to separate estimations for men and women.
On the basis of this test statistic (F = 1.10), the null could not be rejected.
Higher unemployment benefits have a significant positive impact on
the reservation wage of household heads. Other income has a negative
though not significant impact on the reservation wage. For spouses, the
effects of unemployment benefits and other income are both
insignificant.^^
Higher educated household heads have significantly higher reservation
wages, which is plausible. Also the highest educated spouses have sig-
nificantly higher reservation wages. The dummies for the sectors of ed-
ucation are found to be insignificant. Age has a significant and nonlinear
effect on the reservation wages of household heads: the effect is positive
until age 38 and negative thereafter.^' For spouses, both coefficients on
age are significant at the 10% level: the effect is positive until the age of
34 and negative thereafter.
Since neither the value of the house nor the mortgage capital outstand-
ing are included in our measure of net wealth (see previous section), we
entered among the regressors a dummy for house ownership with a mort-
gage.'^ '* This was statistically insignificant for both household heads and
spouses.
Instrumenting Wealth
In order to apply ordinary least squares (OLS) to equation (8), the
explanatory variables, X,, and >!,„ must be uncorrelated with the distur-
^^  As shown in table 1, 74% of the spouses report zero unemployment insurance
income. We have experimented with including a dummy variable for reporting
zero unemployment benefits, but this turned out to be not significant either.
" Interactions of age and wealth did not improve on the performance of the
model.
" We experimented with entering separate dummies for house ownership and
for having a mortgage, but these were found to be almost perfectly coUinear and
also insignificant. Indeed, in the Netherlands those who buy a house are bound
to take a life-long mortgage.
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bances e,,. Individual effects may cause correlation between /!„ and e,,.
Similarly, measurement error in wealth may introduce correlation with
€,,. In these cases, OLS is inconsistent, and instrumental variables (IV)
may be the more appropriate method of estimation. To test for this pos-
sibility, we have carried out a Hausman test. This test statistic is based
on the difference between the OLS estimator and the IV estimator of the
reservation-wage equation. The choice of the variables to be used as in-
struments was made on the basis of the performance of first-stage re-
gressions of wealth and wealth squared on different sets of possible
instruments."
For the sample of heads, we use as instruments, in addition to all
variables included in the reservation-wage equation (except for wealth),
a quadratic in other income and cross-effects of age and other income.
On the basis of the value of the test statistic (0.53), we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no correlation.
For the sample of spouses, first-stage regressions of wealth and wealth
squared did not perform very well, and very few of the explanatory
variables were significant. We included as instruments, in addition to all
explanatory variables from the reservation-wage equation, the income of
the spouse and its square.^' On the basis of the value of the test statistic
(0.22), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation.
Finally, we have estimated the reservation-wage equation dropping the
(logarithm of) expected hours from the right-hand side of the equation.
The results of estimation of the single equation model without hours are
given in table 5. We focus the discussion here on the estimates of the
impact of wealth. For household heads, we still find a positive and sig-
nificant effect of wealth on the reservation-wage rate. Moreover, the size
of the estimated coefficients on wealth and wealth squared does not change
much. A 100% increase in financial assets is found to increase the res-
ervation wage by 1.1%. For spouses, we also find again a positive effect
of wealth on the reservation wage. A 100% increase in financial assets
leads to an increase in the reservation wage by 7.2%, somewhat smaller
than in the specification with hours. Therefore, we can conclude that
excluding expected hours of work from the set of regressors does not
" The practice of selecting instruments on the basis of a first-stage regression
is adapted to avoid serious bias as a result of weak instruments (cf. Bound, Jaeger,
and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997). Moreover, the number of instruments
is held modest (cf. Bekker 1994).
" The spouse's own income turned out not to be a significant determinant of
the value of wealth. Therefore, possible endogeneity of household wealth in the
reservation-wage equation seems to be less of an issue for spouses.
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Table 5
Reservation-Wage Equation: Estimation by OLS of the Specification
without Hours
Variable
Constant
Any child
Woman
Log (age)
[Log (age)]^
Unemployment
income,
1,000 11
Other house-
hold income
Education
level 2
Education
Ievel3
Education
level 4
Wealth,
10,000 fl
Wealth^
House with
mortgage
Wave 2
Adjusted R^
Household
Coefficient
-5.00**
.075**
-.10**
4.72**
-.64**
.037
-.000011
.018
.16**
.22**
.028**
-.0013**
.0064
.0013
.27
.23
Heads
SE
2.54
.037
.04
1.44
.20
.025
.000026
.044
.04
.06
.010
.00044
.048
.033
Spouses
Coefficient
-10.06
-.13
7.80*
-1 .11*
.12*
-.000021
.069
.097
.34**
.048**
-.0018*
-.072
-.12**
.44
.13
SE
7.44
.10
4.23
.60
.07
.000031
.093
.097
.11
.019
.0009
.068
.060
NOTE.—The dependent variable is log (reservation wage per hour). OLS = ordinary least squares.
Household heads include single women (lone mothers are not included). Spouses include only women.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the (net) hourly reservation wage per month, in Dutch guilders
(fl). The number of observations for which both the reservation wage and the expected hours were
available is 284. All the financial variables (income, wealth, unemployment income) are measured in real
terms in 1987 prices for all years. One wave dummy appears (wave 2, 1988) since reservation wages are
observed in 1988 and 1989. Education levels are the individual education levels measured from the lower
level up. The base for the dummy is education level 1. Education level 4 corresponds to higher education.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
affect substantially the significance, the sign, nor the size of the impact
of wealth on the reservation
Joint Model of Transitions and Reservation Wages
Results of estimation of the joint model of transitions, reservation wages
and wealth, described in equations (13), (8), and (9), are given in table 6
" For the specification without hours, we also computed a Hausman test of
the null that wealth is not correlated with the error term. The null is not rejected,
neither for household heads (test statistic, 0.51) nor for spouses (0.23).
Table 6
Results of Estimation of the Model for Household Heads and for the
Specification with Hours
Variable Name
Constant
Any child
Woman
Log (age)
[Log (age)]^
Unemployment in-
come, 1,000 fl
Unemployment other
income, 1,000 fl
Log (hours)
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Woman by log (hours)
Wealth, 10,000 fl
Wealth^
House with mortgage
Wave 1987 or 1988
Wave 1 (1987)
Wave 2 (1988)
Wave 3 (1989)
Any child (t - 1)
Education level 2
it- 1)
Education level 3
( £ - 1 )
Education level 4
( £ - 1 )
Other income (t - 1),
1,000 fl
Other income (t - \f
Ln (age) other income
{t - 1)
Spouse income
it - 1), 1,000 fl
[Spouse income
it - \)Y
Ln (age) spouse in-
come it - \)
a.
p\
p2
Reservation-Wage
Equation
Coefficient
-6.31**
.083**
-1.14**
5.76**
-.78**
.035
-.012
-.16**
.04
.13**
.22**
.31**
.029**
-.0011**
.028
-.03
.26**
2.01**
.089**
SE
2.33
.033
.26
1.34
.19
.022
.023
.06
.04
.04
.05
.08
.010
.0004
.044
.03
.008
.045
.045
Offer-Probability
Equation
Coefficient
4.41
.13
.43
-.47
.46
.80**
.47
- .15
- .96*
-1.96**
SE
19.4
.26
11.1
1.57
.36
.34
.37
.47
.57
.64
Wealth Equation
Coefficient
48.1**
- .11
-27.6**
3.94**
- .23
.10
- .19
- .37*
.14
.26
.09
13.9**
.32**
-3.43**
-3.76
- .25**
1.42**
SE
12.4
.19
7.1
1.02
.30
.30
.31
.20
.26
.26
.34
3.0
.08
.78
2.35
.12
.67
NOTE.—The model estimated is specified in eqq. (8), (9), and (13). The value of the log-likelihood is
— 1,473.42. The correlation coefficients p\, p2, and p$ relate, respectively, to correlations of the errors of
eqq. (7) and (8), (7) and (9), (8) and (9). In this version p2 and p3 are restricted to zero.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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for household heads, and in table 7 for spouses. Expected hours are in-
cluded among the regressors of the reservation-wage equation.^*
The correlations terms between the errors of the wealth equation and
the errors of, respectively, the reservation-wage equation and the job-offer
probability were found insignificant for both household heads and
spouses. Therefore, we have reestimated the model assuming zero error
correlations of wealth and the reservation wage and of wealth and the
offer probability. Also on the basis of a likelihood ratio test this restriction
could not be rejected (x^ = 1.2; see table 8).
Generally, all the variables in the reservation-wage equation have the
expected sign and are significant as in the single equation model in the
previous subsection (table 4). An exception is the coefficient on unem-
ployment benefits that was significant at the 10% level in the single equa-
tion specification and is now insignificant, though still positive. The results
of estimation confirm the finding that wealth has a significant positive
effect on the reservation wage.
With respect to estimation of the job-offer probability, it should be
mentioned that the separate coefficient estimates of age and age squared
are found to affect insignificantly the offer probability. However, the two
age variables are jointly significant. If the term in age squared is dropped
from the model, age becomes significant, and the negative effect domi-
nates. The education dummies are generally not very significant, though
positive, for household heads. Household heads with an intermediate level
of education have significantly higher chances to receive a job offer. For
spouses, all education dummies are statistically significant and positive.
The chances of receiving a job offer increase significantly with the level
of education for women. For both household heads and spouses, we find
that observations drawn from the 1988 and 1989 waves of the survey
have lower probabilities of receiving a job offer. This might be explained
by the worse economic conditions in 1988-89 relative to 1990 (the base
for the wave dummies), as recovery was slowly taking place after the big
rise in unemployment during the economic depression of the mid-eighties.
With respect to the wealth equation, the following comments are in
order. The choice of regressors is made on the basis of first-stage re-
gressions that were performed to test for endogeneity of wealth in the
single run of the reservation-wage equation, for household heads and for
spouses. Most explanatory variables in the wealth equation are lagged 1
period, since wealth is measured 1 period earlier than transitions. Other
income and income of the spouse are measured a time period earlier than
the corresponding variables in the reservation-wage equation. Other
household income has a significant positive impact on wealth for house-
^' Expected hours of work have been set equal to the sample mean when such
information was not recorded.
Table 7
Results of Estimation of the Model for Spouses and for Specification with
Hours
Reservation-Wage
Equation
Offer-Probability
Equation Wealth Equation
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Constant
Any child
Log (age)
[Log (aee)]^
Unemployment in-
come, 1,000 fl
Unemployment
other income,
1,000 fl
Log (hours)
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Wealth, 10,000 fl
Wealth'
House with
mortgage
Wave 1987 or 1988
Wave 1 (1987)
Wave 2 (1988)
Wave 3 (1989)
Education level 2
( t - 1 )
Education level 3
( f - 1 )
Education level 4
( r - 1 )
Other income
(£ - 1), 1,000 fl
Other income
{t - 1)^
Spouse income
(t - 1), 1,000 fl
[Spouse income
{t - \)f
a.
-9.76
- .03
7.41**
-1.05**
.065
.025
.11
.09
.12
.37**
.060**
.0024**
-.077
.12
.43**
3.53**
.16
6.60
.09
3.77
.53
.061
.027
.07
.09
.09
.11
.017
.0010
.061
.06
.021
.12
.10
30.9
-16.7
2.15
.95**
.96**
.95**
.34
- .26*
-1.52**
28.4
16.1
2.28
.43
.43
.46
.37
.48
.53
74.8
-45.8**
6.93**
- .60
.04
- .59
.03
.57
.47
9.45
-23.6
.91**
- . 0 7
35.2
20.1
2.85
.58
.56
.58
.53
.55
.62
11.21
41.3
.41
.05
NOTE.—The model estimated is specified in eqq. (8), (9), and (13). The value of the log-likeUhood is
— 1.615.46. The correlation coefficients pl , p2, and p3 relate, respectively, to correlations of the errors of
eqq. (7) and (8), (7) and (9), and (8) and (9). In this version p2 and p3 are restricted to zero.
' Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
' * Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Tahle 8
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Hypothesis
Household heads, specification with
noursi
Wealth, search income, other in-
come, dummy for house own-
ership with mortgage not in ar-
rival rate
p2 = p3 = 0
Duration dummies not in model
Household heads, specification without
Wealth, search income, other in-
come, dummy for house own-
ership with mortgage not in ar-
rival rate
p2 = p3 = 0
Duration dummies not in model
Spouses, specification with hours:
Wealth, search income, other in-
come, dummy for house own-
ership with mortgage not in ar-
rival rate
p2 = p3 = 0
Duration dummies not in model
Spouses, specification without hours:
Wealth, search income, other in-
come, dummy for house own-
ership with mortgage not in ar-
rival rate
p2 = p3 = 0
Duration dummies not in model
Value Test Statistic
4.5
1.2
33.4
hours:
3.8
1.1
32.6
4.5
4.4
17.3
4.8
3.4
20.7
df
4
2
6
4
2
6
4
2
6
4
2
6
Critical Value 5%
9.5
6.0
12.6
9.5
6.0
12.6
9.5
6.0
12.6
9.5
6.0
12.6
hold heads. Significant nonlinearities in the impact of household income
on wealth are detected, as the squared term is also statistically significant
and positive. An interaction variable of age and other income has a sig-
nificantly negative impact for household heads. Age itself is found to have
a significant nonlinear impact on wealth. Wealth is found to increase
significantly with age, though at a decreasing rate, for both household
heads and spouses. The income of the spouse has a significant nonlinear
impact for heads, which is, however, written out by the significantly
positive interaction with age. The income of the partner has a significantly
positive linear effect for spouses. The quadratic term is not significant.
Education-level dummies are insignificant for both household heads and
spouses.
Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct a tentative empirical test of the impact of wealth on the
offer probability by including wealth in z,, and carrying out a likelihood
ratio test for the statistical significance of the additional regressors. Models
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with endogenous search intensity (see the discussion in Sec. Ill), however,
imply that not only wealth, but also income variables, should be included
in the arrival rate. Therefore, we estimated a model specification that, in
addition to the variables included in table 6, includes the following variable
in the arrival rate: w^ealth, income, other income, and the dummy indi-
cating the possession of a house with a mortgage. We computed the like-
lihood ratio test statistic for testing the null that the coefficients of these
additional variables are jointly zero. The value of the test statistic is 4.5
(see table 8). The null is not rejected.
Results of estimation of the model excluding hours from the regressors
of the reservation-wage equation are given in table 9 for household heads
and in table 10 for spouses. The two sets of results do not differ
substantially.
We have also estimated a model variant that includes dummies for
elapsed unemployment duration (backward recurrence times) in the job-
offer arrival rate, the reservation-wage equation, and the wealth equation
for completeness. These dummies may correlate with unobserved het-
erogeneity, as discussed in the layout of the empirical model. For this
reason, they are not included in our preferred specification. The reference
group for the elapsed unemployment duration dummies are individuals
who have been unemployed for less than 6 months. The results of esti-
mation are presented in table 11 for household heads and in table 12 for
spouses. We find that elapsed duration plays a significant role in explaining
the individual probability of receiving a job offer. Elapsed duration is
statistically significant and negative. This finding is also in line with the
assumption made by Blanchard and Diamond (1994) in their matching
model, where it is assumed that job seekers are ranked by employers only
according to their unemployment duration. Those with longer unem-
ployment durations are assumed to be the last to receive a job offer." The
likelihood ratio test statistic for testing the null that the dummies are not
to be included in the model takes the value 33.4 (see table 8). The null is
rejected. Note that rejection of the null is caused by the significance of
the duration dummies in the arrival rate, while the dummies do not add
to the explanation of the reservation-wage rate or the wealth equation.
Elasticities
To gain more insights on the relation between wealth, reservation wages,
and labor market transitions, we have calculated some elasticities. The
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in table 6 for household
heads and in table 7 for spouses are used to calculate the elasticity of the
"Moreover, models with endogenous search intensity (e.g., Mortensen 1986)
imply that individuals with a lower job-offer probability have lower returns from
searching and therefore will search less intensely.
Table 9
Results of Estimation of the Model for Household Heads and for the
Specification without Hours
Variable
Constant
Any child
Woman
Log (age)
[Log (aee)]'
Unemployment in-
come, 1,000 fl
Unemployment other
income, 1,000 fl
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Wealth, 10,000 fl
Wealth'
House with mortgage
Wave 1987 or 1988
Wave 1 (1987)
Wave 2 (1988)
Wave 3 (1989)
Any child (£ - 1)
Education level 2
(£ - 1)
Education level 3
( £ - 1 )
Education level 4
( £ - 1 )
Other mcome (£ — 1),
1,000 fl
[Other income
(j — 1)]^
Ln (age) other income
( £ - 1 )
Spouse income
(£ - 1), 1,000 fl
[Spouse income
(£ — 1)]^
Ln (age) spouse in-
come (£ - 1)
(T,
''v
n\
p2
p3
Reservation-Wage
Equation
Coefficient
-5.86** 2
.074**
-.10**
5.21** 1
- . 7 1 * *
.028
-.020
.03
.15**
.23**
.027**
-.0012**
.025
-.03
.26**
2.01**
.082**
SE
.32
.034
.03
.32
.19
.022
.023
.04
.04
.05
.009
.0004
.045
.03
.009
.045
.037
Offer-Probability
Equation
Coefficient
29.9
- .05
-13.2
1.36
.44
.74*
.48
-.19
- .93*
-2.15**
SE
25.2
.28
13.9
1.91
.37
.38
.39
.46
.51
.62
Wealth Equation
Coefficient
48.1**
- .11
-27.6**
3.94**
- .23
.10
- .19
- .37*
.14
.26
.09
13.9**
.32**
-3.43**
-3.76
- .25**
1.42**
SE
12.4
.19
7.1
1.02
.30
.30
.31
.20
.26
.26
.34
3.0
.08
.78
2.35
.12
.67
NOTE.—The model estimated is specified in eqq. (8), (9), and (13). The value of the log-likelihood is
— 1479.58. The correlation coefficients pl, p2, and pi relate, respectively, to correlations of the errors of
eqq. (7) and (8), (7) and (9), (8) and (9). In this version p2 and pi are restricted to zero.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 10
Results of Estimation of the Model for Spouses and for the Specification
without Hours
Variable
Constant
Any child
Log (age)
[Log (aee)]^
Unemployment in-
come, 1,000 fl
Unemployment
other income.
1,000 fl
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Wealth, 10,000 fl
Wealth'
House with
mortgage
Wave 1987 or 1988
Wave 1 (1987)
Wave 2 (1988)
Wave 3 (1989)
Education level 2
( £ - 1 )
Education level 3
it - .1)
Education level 4
it- 1)
Other income
(f - 1), 1,000 fl
[Other income
it - \)Y
Spouse income
{t - 1), 1,000 fl
[Spouse income
it - i)r
a
pl
Reservation-Wage
Equation
Coefficient
-10.0
-.06
7.76**
-1.10**
.090
-.021
.07
.09
.34**
.056**
-.0022**
-.11
- .11
.43**
3.53**
.16
SE
6.60
.08
3.76
.53
.059
.028
.09
.09
.10
.017
.0009
.058
.06
.021
.12
.10
Offer-Probability
Equation
Coefficient
28.8
-15.3
1.92
.94**
.93**
.94**
.34
-.16*
-1.45**
SE
27.8
15.8
2.24
.44
.44
.46
.37
.45
.50
Wealth Equation
Coefficient
74.8
-45.8**
6.93**
- .60
.04
- .59
.03
.57
.47
9.45
-23.6
.91**
- .07
SE
35.2
20.1
2.85
.58
.56
.58
.53
.55
.62
11.21
41.3
.41
.05
NOTE.—The model estimated is specified in eqq. (8), (9), and (13). The value of the log-likelihood is
— 1616.98. The correlation coefficients p\, fi2, ana p3 relate, respectively, to correlations or the errors of
eqq. (7) and (8), (7) and (9), (8) and (9). In this version p2 and p3 are restricted to zero.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
*• Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 11
Results of Estimation of the Model for Household Heads and for the
Specification with Hours and Duration Dummies
Variable
Constant
Any child
Woman
Log (age)
[Log (aee)]'
Unemployment mcome,
1,000 {(
Unemployment other in-
come, 1,000 fl
Log (hours)
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Woman hy log (hours)
Wealth, 10,000 fl
Wealth'
House with mortgage
Wave 1987 or 1988
Elapsed duration 6-16
months
Elapsed duration > 16
months
Wave 1 (1987)
Wave 2 (1988)
Wave 3 (1989)
Any child (f - 1)
Education level 2 (f - 1)
Education level 3 (t - 1)
Education level 4 (t — 1)
Other income (t — \),
1,000 fl
[Other income (f — 1)]'
Ln (age) other income
( r -1)
Spouse income (t — 1),
1,000 fl
[Spouse income (f — 1)]^
Ln (age) spouse income
(t- 1)
"v
'i
Reservation-Wage
Equation
Coefficient
-6.30**
.087**
-1.14**
5.74**
-.78**
.033
-.010
-.16**
.02
.13**
.20**
.31**
.028**
-.0012**
.019
- .03
.079
-.037
.25**
2.01**
.035**
SE
2.34
.034
.26
1.34
.19
.023
.023
.06
.04
.04
.05
.08
.010
.0004
.044
.03
.049
.039
.008
.045
.043
Offer-Probability
Equation
Coefficient
-8.00
.16
7.22
-1.33
.26
.61
.11
-.44
-1.41**
-.18
- .67
-1.63**
SE
18.2
.26
10.4
1.46
.35
.33
.38
.39
.30
.38
.43
.49
Wealth Equation
Coefficient
48.1**
- .11
-27.7**
3.95**
.36
.07
-.24
.12
- .18
- .37*
.13
.26
.06
13.7**
.32**
-3.37**
-3.78
- .24*
1.41**
SE
12.6
.19
7.2
1.03
.28
.22
.30
.30
.31
.20
.26
.26
.34
3.0
.08
.78
2.36
.12
.68
NOTE.—The model estimated is specified in eqq. (8), (9), and (13). The value of the log-likelihood is
— 1456.72. The correlation coefficients pi , p2, and p3 relate, respectively, to correlations of the errors of
eqq. (7) and (8), (7) and (9), (8) and (9). In this version p2 and p3 are restricted to zero.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 12
Results of Estimation of the Model for Spouses and for the Specification
with Hours and Duration Dummies
Variable
Constant
Any child
Log (age)
[Log (aee)]^
Unemployment in-
come, 1,000 fl
Unemployment other
income, 1,000 fl
Log (hours)
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Wealth, 10,000 fl
Wealth^
House with mortgage
Wave 1987 or 1988
Elapsed duration 6-16
months
Elapsed duration > 16
months
Wave 1 (1987)
Wave 2 (1988)
Wave 3 (1989)
Education level 2
( £ - 1 )
Education level 3
( £ - 1 )
Education level 4
( £ - 1 )
Other income
(£ - 1), 1,000 fl
[Other income
{t — i)p
Spouse income
(£ - 1), 1,000 fl
[Spouse income
{t — l)Y
CT,
"v
p2
pj
Reservation-Wage
Equation
Coefficient
-10.1
- .07
7.77*
-1 .11*
.068
-.022
.08
.13
.16*
.37**
.061 »*
-.0024**
-.090
-.13
-.19*
-.10
.42**
3.53**
.049
SE
7.39
.09
4.21
.59
.067
.028
.07
.09
.09
.11
.018
.0010
.063
.06
.11
.09
.021
.12
.092
Offer-Probability
Equation
Coefficient
7.58
-2.96
.19
1.09**
1.19**
.85*
-1.11**
-1.34**
.36
.12
-1.12**
SE
26.0
14.8
2.10
.48
.47
.45
.51
.39
.31
.36
.41
Wealth Equation
Coefficient
71.8
-44.0**
6.68**
-.22
- .20
- .60
.01
- .59
.04
.59
.48
9.01
-22.0
.92**
- .07
SE
36.4
20.7
2.94
.63
.46
.58
.55
.57
.50
.55
.62
11.22
41.3
.41
.05
NOTE.—The model estimated is specified in eaq. (8), (9), and (13). The value of the log-likelihood is
— 1606.79. The correlation coefficients pl , p2, and p3 relate, respectively, to correlations ot the errors of
eqq. (7) and (8), (7) and (9), (8) and (9). In this version p2 and p3 are restricted to zero.
' Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 13
Estimated Elasticities
Model for
Elasticity
Reservation wage
to wealth (1)
Reservation wage
to wealth (2)
Reservation wage
to wealth (3)
Transition probability
to reservation
wage (1)
Transition probability
to reservation
wage (2)
Transition probability
to reservation
wage (3)
Transition probability
to wealth (1)
Transition probability
to wealth (2)
Transition probability
to wealth (3)
Household
Heads with
Hours
Value
.012
.0062
.013
-.91
-1.36
-1.30
-.011
-.0085
-.017
SE
.0037
.0020
.0041
.075
.094
.085
.0034
.0027
.0053
Household
Heads without
Hours
Value
.011
.0059
.012
-1.00
-1.45
-1.31
-.011
-.0086
-.016
SE
.0038
.0020
.0042
.068
.084
.'S71
.0038
.0029
.0055
Spouses with
Hours
Value
.12
.038
- .65
-.45
-.077
-.017
SE
.034
.011
.079
.053
.024
.0053
Spouses with-
out Hours
Value
.11
.036
-.81
- .60
-.091
-.021
SE
.033
.011
.095
.065
.030
.0069
NOTE.—The elasticities defined as 1, 2, and 3 relate, respectively, to the high skilled, the low skilled,
and women. The elasticities are computed using the sample means of the other variables for each group,
1, 2, and 3.
reservation wage with respect to wealth, the elasticity of the transition
probability with respect to the reservation wage, and tbe elasticity of the
transition probability with respect to wealth. We have calculated these
elasticities for representative individuals who differ by gender and edu-
cation level.'°
The elasticities are also computed for the model without hours, based
on the results in table 9 for heads and table 10 for spouses. The estimated
elasticities and their standard errors are reported in table 13.
For household heads, the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect
to wealth is significantly positive for all the subgroups considered. It takes
the largest value for women and the smallest for the lower educated. The
size of the elasticity is rather small. A 100% increase in the level of wealth
would result in a 1.2% increase in the reservation wage of the higher
educated. The value of these elasticities does not change much if they are
computed on the basis of the specification without hours instead of the
specification with hours.
For household heads, the elasticity of the transition probability with
°^ The other explanatory variables take average values for the corresponding
samples defined by education level and by gender.
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respect to the reservation wage is significantly negative, and it shows the
largest value, in absolute terms, for the lower educated. The size of the
impact is rather large: for the lower educated, we find that a 10% increase
in the level of the reservation wage would lower by 13.6% the employ-
ment probability for this group. We also find that the specification without
hours shows a slightly larger sensitivity of the elasticity of the transition
probability with respect to the reservation wage. The differences in the
elasticities between the specifications are not too high, and the values are
within the range of each other's 5% confidence interval.
Finally, for household heads, the elasticity of the transition probability
with respect to wealth is significantly negative, though small for all the
three groups. The impact of wealth is found to be the largest in absolute
value for women. An increase of 100% in the level of wealth would lower
a woman's employment probability by 1.7% on average. We find hardly
any difference in the elasticities from either specification with hours or
without hours.
For spouses, we computed the elasticities for both the higher and the
lower educated. For spouses, the elasticity of the reservation wage with
respect to wealth is estimated to be significantly positive for both the
higher and the lower educated. It is the highest for the higher educated.
A 100% increase in the wealth of the higher educated leads to an increase
in the reservation wage of 12%. There is hardly any difference between
the values of the elasticities when we compare the specifications with and
without hours.
For spouses, the transition probability is less sensitive with respect to
the reservation wage than for household heads. For both higher and lower
educated spouses, the estimate of this elasticity is significant and negative.
The impact of the reservation wage is the largest for the higher educated
spouses. A 10% increase in the reservation wage leads to a 6.5% decrease
in the transition probability. We see relatively large differences when we
compare the specification with hours with the specification without hours.
For the lower educated, the estimated elasticities for the different speci-
fications are even outside each other's 5% confidence intervals. This dif-
ference must be due to the differences in the estimated wage-offer dis-
tribution with and without hours, since the estimated reservation wage
is hardly different for the two specifications.
Finally, the estimated elasticity of the transition probability with respect
to wealth is negative and significant. The impact of wealth is the largest
for the higher educated. A 100% increase in the level of wealth leads to
a 1 ^ °/o decrease in the transition probability of the higher educated
spouses. The model specification without hours shows a larger sensitivity
to the transition probabihty with respect to wealth, but the estimated
values for the different specifications are within each other's 5% confi-
dence intervals.
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VI. Conclusions
In this article, we have investigated the impact of financial asset holdings
on the employment probability, using individual data for the Netherlands.
Theoretical work in the area of structural models of job search (Danforth
1979) indicates that financial wealth has a positive impact on the reser-
vation wage. Previous applied work in this field restricted attention to
the impact of savings on the employment probability (Bloemen 1995) and
the duration of the unemployment spells (Stancanelli 1999). An original
feature of the current study is the attempt made to estimate the impact
of wealth on the reservation wage and, via this channel, on the reem-
ployment probability. Subjective reservation wages are used for this pur-
pose. The analysis is carried out with separate samples for household
heads and spouses.
On the basis of the estimation of a reservation-wage equation, we are
able to conclude that wealth has a significant positive effect on the res-
ervation wage. Overall, our findings concerning the reservation-wage
equation are very reasonable and in line with the theoretical expectations.
Age is found to have a significant effect on the reservation wage. We reject
the possibility of measurement error or endogeneity of wealth on the
basis of a Hausman test.
Next, we have estimated a simultaneous-equations model of transitions
into employment, reservation wages, and wealth. In this model, the em-
ployment probability is equal to the product of the acceptance probability
(job offers are accepted when the reservation wage exceeds the mean of
the wage-offer distribution) and the offer probability. We find no signif-
icant correlation of the errors of the wealth equation and the errors of,
respectively, the reservation-wage equation and the offer-probability
equation.
We conclude that financial wealth has a positive impact on the reser-
vation wage and a negative impact on the employment probability. Higher
levels of wealth result in higher reservation wages, and higher reservation
wages are associated with a lower employment probability.
We have estimated elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to
the level of wealth and of the transition probability with respect to the
reservation wage and to the level of wealth. We have computed these
elasticities for the lower educated, the higher educated, and women. The
estimates of the elasticities show that the overall impact of wealth on the
transition probability is small. The impact of wealth on the reservation
wage and the transition probability is larger for spouses than for house-
hold heads.
An interesting question that we have not addressed here is whether
higher levels of wealth reduce the employment probability but increase
the quality of job matches.
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Appendix A
The Wage-Offer Distribution
Table Al shows the estimation results of the reduced-form wage-par-
ticipation model for household heads. Both a specification with hours
and a specification without hours have been estimated. Table A2 gives
the results for the spouses.
Appendix B
Additional Details about the Data
In this appendix we provide some additional background information
with respect to the data. Given the fact that we use longitudinal data and
observations are selected at different points in time and pooled together
(see Sec. IV for details), multiple observations on the same individual at
different points in time are used for some individuals. Table Bl shows
Table Al
Wage-Offer Distribution and the Selection Equation for Household Heads
Variable
Cotistant
Any child
Woman
Log (age)
[Log (age)]^
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Education sector 2
Education sector 3
Education sector 4
Single
Spouse income
Other income
Wave 1987
Wave 1988
Log hours
[Log hours]^
Woman by log hours
Heckman's correction
Log-likelihood
T
R'
Selection Equation
Coefficient
11.39**
.16**
- . 5 1 * *
-5.73**
.80**
.18**
49 »»
.52**
.11**
.26**
.22**
-.29**
.17**
.085**
-.09
-.02
-1,865.9
SE
3.31
.06
.06
1.86
.26
.08
.08
.08
.07
.7
.08
.07
.04
.06
.05
.05
Wage-Offer
Hours Included
Coefficient
-6.85**
-1.07**
6.31**
-.82**
.080**
.16**
.43**
-.035**
.06**
-.06**
-.001
.010
-.36**
.002
.25**
-.02
.33
.34
SE
.06
.08
.33
.05
.02
.02
.02
.01
.01
.01
.009
.009
.06
.010
.002
.093
Distribution
Without Hours
Coefficient
-5.9**
-.14**
5.06**
-.64**
.085**
.17**
.45**
-.054**
.036**
-.08**
-.002
.01
.0004
.34
.29
SE
.61
.02
.34
.05
.02
.02
.02
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.10
NOTE.—Education level and sector dummies are defined in the text. The selection equation is specified
as a probit of the probability of being employed. The probability is estimated over the sample of un-
employed job searcners (552 persons) and employed individuals (9,230 persons). The wage-offer equation
is estimated by ordinary least squares controlling for sample selectivity along the lines of Heckman's
two-step procedure. Heckman's correction is computed as the inverse of Mill's ratio. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the wage per hour.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table A2
Wage-Offer Distribution and the Selection Equation for Spouses
Variable
Constant
Any child
Log (age)
[Log (age)]^
Education level 2
Education level 3
Education level 4
Education sector 2
Education sector 3
Education sector 4
Single
Spouse income
Other income
Wave 1987
Wave 1988
Log hours
[Log hours]^
HecKman's correction
Log-likelihood
T
R'
Selection Equation
Coefficient
16.45**
- . 4 1 * *
-9.18**
1.38»*
.12
.30**
.10
.11
.14*
.047
-.08
-.024
1.28**
.06
.02
-1,393.9
SE
5.28
.07
3.00
.42
.09
.10
.10
.18
.08
.074
.10
.020
.38
.06
.06
Wage-Offer
Hours Included
Coefficient
-7.51**
6.52**
-.90**
.093**
.16**
.37**
-.20**
-.062**
- .13**
- .031*
-.018
-.10*
.0019
-.78**
.36
.16
SE
1.23
.72
.10
.024
.03
.03
.04
.019
.02
.016
.015
.06
.011
.12
Distribution
Without Hours
Coefficient
-6.30**
5.50**
-.74**
.10**
.18**
.37**
-.19**
-.049**
- . 1 1 * *
-.016
-.010
- .38**
.37
.14
SE
1.23
.72
.10
.02
.03
.03
.04
.019
.02
.016
.016
.11
NOTE.—The selection equation is specified as a probit of the probability of being employed. The
probability is estimated over the sample of unemployed job searchers (460 persons) and employed in-
dividuals (3,837 persons). The wage-offer equation is estimated by ordinary least squares controlling for
sample selectivity along the lines of Heckman's two steps procedure. Heckman's correction is computed
as the inverse Mill's ratio. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the wage per hour.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
how many observations are observed more than once. Table B2 contains
information from different data sources about the occurrence of long-
term unemployment in the Netherlands in the period covered by our
sample.
Table B3 provides some information on the selection of the sample and
the stages at which observations were lost due to attrition. First, individ-
uals were selected from each wave on the basis of their labor market state
and the requirement that wealth is observed (selection 1). Table B3 also
shows the resulting number of observations. The next selection criterion
adopted is that a labor market transition might be observed, that is, the
individual should participate in more than one wave (selection 2). This is
also necessary to be able to observe past values of the variables for es-
timation of the wealth equation (see text). In total, 85% of the heads and
88% of the spouses selected in stage 1 remain in the sample after appli-
cation of this second selection criterion.
Finally, observations are selected for which relevant additional back-
ground characteristics are observed (selection 3). This keeps 99% of the
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Table Bl
Multiple Observations and Long-Term Unemployment
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Frequency
of
Observation
Observed
once
Observed
twice
Observed
three
times
Observed
four
times
Total num-
ber of
(different)
individu-
als
Multiple
Household Heads
Observations Total
(%)
208
(59.8)
85
(24.4)
34
(9.8)
21
(6.0)
348
(100)
Observations
208
170
102
84
Long-Term
Unemploy-
ment
(%)
81
(38.9)
91
(53.5)
73
(71.6)
77
(91.7)
Multiple
Observations
(%)
237
(70.5)
74
(22.0)
21
(6.3)
4
(1.2)
336
(100)
Spouses
Total
Observations
237
148
63
16
Long-Term
Unemploy-
ment
(%)
156
(65.8)
104
(70.3)
53
(84.1)
15
(93.8)
NOTE. —Long-term unemployment is defined as lasting longer than 16 months, and it is measured
with respect to all individuals, i.e., over multiple observations of the same individual when this is the
case.
heads and 93% of the spouses selected at stage 2 in the sample. In addition
to the observations selected as described above, individuals for whom
reservation wages are observed and that were not selected on the basis
of the second criterion applied at stage 2 are added to the sample.
Appendix C
Comparing Wages and Reservation Wages
We compare the distribution of wages with the distribution of reser-
vation wages, using the October 1988 and October 1989 waves from the
SEP. The reservation wages from the October 1988 and 1989 waves are
compared to the wages from the same waves. To correct for differences
due to differences in working hours, we base the comparison on hourly
reservation wages and hourly wages. We base our comparison on wages
and reservation wages disaggregated, first, by four different levels of ed-
ucation and, next, by three different age groups. These are defined as
follows: age group a, up to 30; age group b, older than 30 and up to 40;
age group c, 40 and older. Table Cl refers to household heads, and table
C2 to spouses. For all cases considered, the quartiles of the distribution
of wages are larger than the quartiles of the distribution of reservation
wages.
Next, we compare the reservation wages with the wages observed before
the unemployment spell and with the accepted wages for the same in-
Table B2
Long-Term Unemployment in the Netherlands:
Different Definitions
Unemployment >
1 year
A. Statistics Neth-
erlands:
1986
1987
1988'-
B. Incidence of
long-term un-
employment
from survey-
based data:
1987
1988
1989
1990
C. Incidence of
registered
long-term
unemploy-
ment:
1987
1988
1989
1990
Men
(%)
56.2
55.1
50.6
56.0
56.3
55.5
57.5
53.6
59.6
62.1
Women
(%)
50.7
49.9
41.3
44.6
44.0
42.4
52.4
47.3
51.7
49.6
Total
(%)
54.2
53.2
55.7
46.2
50.0
49.9
48.4
55.6
51.2
56.7
57.4
SOURCES.—Panel A, "Statistisch Yearboek," 1988 and 1990, Dutcb na-
tional statistical offices (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek); panel B,
"Employment Outlook," July 1992, Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD); panel C, "Employment Outlook,"
July 1992, July 1994, OECD.
' Information on the duration of unemployment is not available by
gender in 1988 and not available for the 1990s in published statistics.
Table B3
Sample Selection
Heads:
Selection 1
Selection 2
Selection 3
Spouses:
Selection 1
Selection 2
Selection 3
Wave 1987
163
149
144
129
111
99
Number of Observations Obtained
Wave 1988
151
134
136
127
117
107
Wave 1989
148
122
122
153
132
125
by Selection
Wave 1990
147
113
113
145
129
123
Total
609
518
515
554
489
454
NOTE.—Selection 1 = nonworking individuals, searching for a job, assets observed; selection 2 =
observed whether a labor market transition occurred between date of selection 1 and a year later; selection
3 = remaining background variables observed (final selection). In addition to the number of observation
with transitions observed, there are 37 household heads and 20 spouses with an observation on the
reservation wage, wealth, and the relevant background variables but not an observation on the labor
market transition.
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Table Cl
Distribution of Hourly Wages and Reservation Wages of Housebold Heads
by Education and Age
Quartiles
1988
Quartiles
1989
Sample
Number of
Observations 1
Number of
Observations
Wage, all
Reservation wage,
all
Wage, education 1
Reservation wage,
education 1
Wage, education 2
Reservation wage,
education 2
Wage, education 3
Reservation wage,
education 3
Wage, education 4
Reservation wage,
education 4
Wage, age a
Reservation wage,
age a
Wage, age b
Reservation wage,
age b
Wage, age c
Reservation wage,
agec
2,838 12.60 15.29 19.71
142
370
40
552
40
1,277
9.15
11.55
8.65
11.47
8.94
12.79
41
1,639
21
749
46
1,009
55
1,080
41
9.62
15.65
10.10
11.37
7.69
13.20
9.23
13.29
10.72
13.48
9.76
13.25
10.65
15.24
11.54
19.97
11.54
13.25
10.38
15.75
10.82
16.95
12.69
16.62
10.80
16.41
11.84
18.77
14.42
26.65
16.52
17.18
11.54
19.75
12.69
22.07
9.23 11.18 13.85
3,648
143
314
35
794
37
1,659
49
881
22
1,084
48
1,269
48
1,295
47
12.86 15.61 19.15
9.23
11.44
9.23
11.54
7.5
12.98
9.23
15.69
9.81
11.40
6.92
13.88
9.81
14.11
10.65
13.85
10.38
14.02
10.02
15.46
10.93
19.03
12.40
13.42
9.81
16.19
11.25
17.10
12.69
16.18
11.54
16.48
11.54
18.31
13.70
23.59
17.31
15.85
10.93
19.48
12.82
21.51
9.23 10.96 13.85
NOTE.—Age group a = up to 30; age group b = older than 30 and up to 40; age group c = 40 and
older. The (reservation) wages are defined as hourly net (reservation) wages and measured in guilders.
Our definition of household heads does not include lone parents.
dividual. A problem with this procedure is that reservation wages and
accepted wages are not observed at the same point in time. Reservation
wages were collected in three waves of the SEP: the October 1988 wave,
the April 1989 wave, and the October 1989 wave. Information on income
was collected in October of each year. From 1990, it was collected in
May. Furthermore, in the eighties, net income (after tax) was asked, while
in the nineties, the before-tax income in the previous year was asked.
Therefore, the wage information is not homogenous between the eighties
and the nineties, which makes comparison of reservation wages and ac-
cepted wages even less accurate for that period. We restrict our comparison
to the eighties.
In table C3, we report the median values of the differences between
previous wages and reservation wages and between accepted wages and
reservation wages. For workers who are laid off, reservation wages are
bound to be below the wages before unemployment.
We compare wages from October 1987 with reservation wages from
October 1988, and wages from October 1988 with reservation wages from
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Table C2
Distribution of Hourly Wages and Reservation Wages of Spouses by
Education and Age
Quartiles
1988
Quartiles
1989
Sample
Number of
Observations
Number of
Observations
Wage, all
Reservation wage,
all
Wage, education 1
Reservation wage,
education 1
Wage, education 2
Reservation wage,
education 2
Wage, education 3
Reservation wage,
education 3
Wage, education 4
Reservation wage,
education 4
Wage, age a
Reservation wage,
age a
Wage, age b
Reservation wage,
age b
Wage, age c
Reservation wage,
age c
1,035
146
142
33
275
40
437
46
181
27
403
48
329
70
303
28
10,91 13,47 18,46
7,5
10,05
6,92
10,32
7,36
11,30
6,92
13,03
11,08
10,32
7,60
11,91
7,5
11,30
9,23
12,64
8,94
12,35
8,65
13,55
9,23
16,49
11,54
12,11
9,23
15,05
9,23
14,10
11,54
19,02
10,38
16,15
9,62
18,03
10,77
21,63
16,15
15,46
11,54
21,28
11,54
20,13
6,92 9,17 10,77
1,006
157
82
24
268
53
440
49
216
31
401
47
312
71
293
39
11,73 14,13 17,8
7,69
10,63
7,5
10,64
7,5
12,0
7,21
13,27
10,38
10,95
7,5
12,39
8,08
12,37
9,62
12,73
9,23
13,21
9,23
13,96
9,72
16,34
12,26
12,93
9,62
15,50
9,62
15,18
11,54
17,44
10,01
15,90
10,77
17,26
11,54
20,45
14,74
15,32
10,82
19,55
11,54
19,56
6,35 9,62 11,54
NOTE, —The (reservation) wages are defined as hourly net (reservation) wages and measured in guilders.
April 1989. One problem here is the low number of observations for
which these statistics are available. For both household heads and spouses,
the median difference between the previous wage and the reservation wage
is positive in both periods considered.
Next, we compare the reservation wages from the October 1988 survey
with the accepted wages from the October 1989 survey, and the reservation
wages from the April 1989 survey with the accepted wages from the
October 1989 survey. Again, the main problem here is the small number
of observations for which the comparison can be carried out. For the first
case, we have 29 observations for household heads and 23 for spouses;
for the second, we have 19 observations for household heads and 21 for
spouses.'' For heads, the median difference is positive for both periods
of observation. For spouses, the median difference is positive for the first
case and negative, although close to zero, for the second.
•" We observe only individuals who are unemployed, searching for a job, report
a reservation wage, and who made a transition into a job in the following period
and reported the value of the wage.
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Table C3
Differences between Reservation Wages and Wages before and after the
Start of the Unemployment Spell
Individual
Differences
Before unemploy-
ment-reservation
wage:
Wage October 1987-
reservation wage
October 1988
Wage October 1988-
reservation wage
April 1989
Accepted wage-reservation
Wage October 1989-
reservation wage
October 1988
Wage October 1989-
reservation wage
April 1989
Household
Heads
Number of
Observations
26
19
wage:
29
19
Median
3.31
7.42
1.60
1.86
Spouses
Number of
Observations Median
24 3.76
17 3.91
23 1.82
21 - .36
NOTE.—The (reservation) wages are defined as hourly net (reservation) wages and measured in guilders.
These are differences in previous wages, accepted wages, and reservation wages for the same individual.
A final remark is that the median difference between the previous wage
and the reservation wage is higher than the median difference between
the accepted wage and the reservation wage.
Appendix D
Possible Endogeneity of Hours
In order to be able to compare reservation wages for individuals with
different expected hours, we take as the left-hand-side variable of the
reservation-wage equation the logarithm of the reservation wage per hour.
However, hours may also capture the impact of individual preferences on
the reservation wage. Most models of job search tend to ignore the role
played by working hours in the formation of preferences and concentrate
on the job-acceptance decision.'^ Exceptions are Burdett and Mortensen
(1978) and Bloemen (1997). Bloemen (1997) shows that the way in which
hours influence the reservation-wage rate depends on the process by
which expectations about hours are formed. If individuals expect to be
able to work according to their desired number of working hours, the
theoretical reservation-wage rate can be solved for from an implicit equa-
tion, expressed in terms of the indirect utility function. If individuals are
faced with restrictions on the number of hours offered to them, the res-
" This is also the case in the model by Danforth (1979) and the one by Blundell
et al. (1997), who focus on the influence of wealth on job-search behavior.
438 Bloemen/Stancanelli
ervation-wage rate will be a function of working hours. In particular,
Bloemen (1997) shows that the reservation wage will then take its min-
imum value if the working hours offered are equal to the desired hours,
as individuals need to be compensated more for working hours that are
farther away from their desired hours. This provides us with a motivation
for the inclusion of the (logarithm of the) expected working hours on the
right-hand side of the empirical reservation-wage equation.
In order to incorporate explicitly the choice of working hours in the
theoretical framework set up by Danforth (1979) or by Blundell et al.
(1997), one should model the expectation process on hours, including
possible restrictions on the hours offered. This is beyond the scope of
this article, which focuses on estimating the empirical relation between
wealth and the job-acceptance decision. Note, however, that the phrasing
and the ordering of the questions on expected hours and reservation wages
is such that reservation wages are conditioned on hours by construction.
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